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Abstract
A recent claim by Bassi and Ghirardi that the consistent (decoherent) histories
approach cannot provide a realistic interpretation of quantum theory is shown to be
based upon a misunderstanding of the single-framework rule: they have replaced the
correct rule with a principle which directly contradicts it. It is their assumptions, not
those of the consistent histories approach, which lead to a logical contradiction.
1 Introduction
The first paper on the consistent histories (CH) interpretation of quantum theory was pub-
lished in the Journal of Statistical Physics in 1984 [1]. In the years since then this approach,
sometimes called “decoherent histories”, has been refined and extended in several books and
papers, of which some of the more significant are [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. It provides a realistic
picture of the atomic realm without the need to invoke quantum measurement as a funda-
mental principle, and for this reason it can resolve the “measurement problem” [8] (there
are actually two measurement problems, see [9]) which has long beset attempts to place the
foundations of quantum theory on a sound basis, and which probably cannot be dealt with
consistently by traditional methods [10]. Because it resolves various quantum paradoxes
[1, 11] using an analysis based upon the mathematics of Hilbert space, the CH approach re-
moves any need to look for alternatives to standard quantum theory, such as those found in
the hidden-variables approach of de Broglie and Bohm [12], or in the spontaneous reduction
ideas of Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber, and Pearle [13].
There have, to be sure, been a number of criticisms of the CH approach, and these have
proven helpful in constructing improved versions of the formalism, and better expositions of
its physical interpretation. The most significant of these criticisms are discussed in [6], and
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reasons are given why they do not invalidate CH quantum theory. This reference provides
the material needed to counter various claims, such as in [14], that the CH approach is
logically inconsistent or unsound. In this connection it is worth pointing out that even one
of its severest critics has admitted that the CH approach is logically consistent when its rules
are properly followed [15].
One of these rules, known as the single framework (or single family, single logic, or sin-
gle set) rule, plays a central role in the CH approach, as has been repeatedly emphasized
in various publications [4, 5, 6, 7]. Despite the extensive discussion of this rule in the CH
literature, accompanied by numerous applications to specific problems, it is still sometimes
misunderstood, as in some recent work by Bassi and Ghirardi [16, 17, 18]. In particular,
these authors have claimed, in an article [17] appearing in this Journal, that the CH in-
terpretation of quantum theory when interpreted in a realistic way using some reasonable
assumptions leads to contradictions in the sense of violating a result of Bell [19], and Kochen
and Specker [20]. On the face of it this seems rather surprising. The Bell-Kochen-Specker
result shows that a certain type of hidden-variables approach to quantum theory can lead
to a contradiction because it makes assumptions incompatible with the structure of Hilbert
space. On the other hand, the CH interpretation has been explicitly constructed to take
account of the structure of Hilbert space, and does not rely on hidden variables in any way.
Closer examination shows that the Bassi and Ghirardi argument violates the single-
framework rule, and thus the claimed contradiction with Bell-Kochen-Specker is not a con-
sequence of the principles of the CH approach, but is instead due to Bassi and Ghirardi’s
having rejected those principles. This was pointed out in [21] in response to [16], but since
[17] is considerably longer and also somewhat clearer than [16], raises the issue in a some-
what different way, and has appeared in a different journal, a separate reply to it seems
appropriate. The present article, in order to be self-contained, contains a certain amount of
overlap with [21].
Since the arguments in [17] (as in [16]) deal entirely with the Hilbert space description of a
system at a single time, most of the formal machinery of the CH approach—histories, consis-
tency, and assignment of probabilities by use of the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation—
is not needed for the following discussion. The essential point we wish to make is that a
quantum Hilbert space differs in crucial respects from a classical phase space, and this math-
ematical difference must be reflected in any valid physical interpretation of quantum theory.
Importing “intuitively obvious” ideas of classical physics into quantum mechanics without
paying adequate attention to the mathematical structure of the latter, in direct contradiction
to the rules of the CH interpretation, is what has given rise to the contradiction noted by
Bassi and Ghirardi, as we shall show.
Before dealing with the main issue, we need to indicate the connection between truth
functionals—our name for the homomorphisms denoted by h in [17]—and certain elemen-
tary concepts from standard probability theory. This is done in Sec. 2, and the quantum
counterparts of truth functionals and probability concepts are taken up in Sec. 3, along with
the single-framework rule. In Sec. 4 we show that in their argument Bassi and Ghirardi
have mistakenly replaced the single-framework rule with what we call the every-framework
principle, which is not only not the same as the single-framework rule, but stands in direct
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contradiction to it; for this reason their argument has basically nothing to do with CH quan-
tum theory. Section 5 responds to some other less-important issues in [17], and Sec. 6 has a
brief conclusion.
2 Sample Spaces and Truth Functionals
A basic concept in elementary probability theory is that of a sample space. According to
Feller [22], the possible outcomes of an idealized experiment correspond to precisely one and
only one point of the sample space. If a coin is tossed, the sample space consists of two
possibilities, H and T; if a die is rolled, there are six points in the sample space. Before the
idealized experiment is carried out one does not, in general, know what the outcome will be,
but when it has taken place, one and only one of the outcomes actually occurs, i.e., is the
true result of the experiment. The books on probability theory with which I am familiar do
not seem to employ the terms “true” and “false”, but the way in which they define a sample
space justifies the association of “true” with the sample point that represents the actual
outcome, and “false” with all the others. In addition, Feller distinguishes simple events, the
elements of the sample space, from compound events which are associated with some subset
of the elements of the sample space. A compound event is “true” if it contains the point of
the sample space which actually occurs, and is “false” otherwise.
Rather than the terminology of ordinary probability theory, [17] uses what I call a truth
functional: a homomorphism (there denoted by h) from a Boolean algebra of events to the
set {0, 1}, also thought of as a Boolean algebra. In light of the preceding remarks, the
connection of a sample space, and its corresponding event algebra, to a system of truth
functionals can be explained in the following way. Let S be the sample space, and P be
some subset of S, thus a compound event in Feller’s terminology. The indicator P of P is
a function on S taking the value 1 at all points which lie in P and 0 at all other points of
S. The usual Boolean algebra of subsets of S is then isomorphic to a Boolean algebra B of
indicator functions in which the greatest element is the function I, equal to 1 at all points of
S; the least element is 0, equal to 0 everywhere; the complement of an indicator P is I −P ;
the join P ∩ Q of two indicators is their product PQ; and the meet P ∪ Q is the indicator
P +Q− PQ.
A truth functional θ is then a function which assigns to each indicator in the algebra B
either the value 1 (true) or 0 (false) in a way which satisfies the following three conditions:
θ(I) = 1, θ(I − P ) = 1− θ(P ), θ(PQ) = θ(P )θ(Q). (1)
It is not hard to show that any such function is necessarily of the form
θq(P ) = P (q) =
{
1 if q ∈ P,
0 if q /∈ P,
(2)
where q is some point in the sample space S. One should think of θq as the the truth
functional appropriate for the case in which the sample point q actually occurs, or is true,
since it then assigns the value 1 (true) to every compound event which contains q, and 0
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(false) to the ones which do not contain q. If the sample space is discrete, one can think
of θq(P ) in probabilistic terms as the conditional probability of P given q, assuming the
probability of q is greater than zero, so that the conditional probability is defined. It is in
this sense, among others, that one can say that “true” is associated with a (conditional)
probability of 1, and “false” with probability 0, in a probabilistic theory.
This approach can be employed in classical statistical mechanics in the following way.
Let γ be a representative point of the phase space Γ. A physical property P of the system
corresponds to the subset P of Γ consisting of those points γ for which this property is true.
The corresponding indicator P (γ) is 1 whenever γ is in P, and 0 otherwise. For example,
if P is the property that the total energy of a one-dimensional harmonic oscillator is less
than some constant E0, P is the region inside an appropriate ellipse in the x, p plane (x the
position, p the momentum), and P (γ) is 1 for γ inside and 0 for γ outside this ellipse.
Now consider a coarse graining of the phase space into a collection D ofN non-overlapping
regions or “cells”. We can write the identity indicator I (equal to 1 for all γ) in the form
I =
N∑
j=1
Dj, (3)
where Dj is the indicator corresponding to the j’th cell. Since the cells do not overlap it
follows that
DjDk = δjkDj, (4)
consistent with the obvious fact that I2 = I. The set of 2N indicators which can be written
as
P =
N∑
j=1
pijDj, (5)
with pij is either 0 or 1, form a Boolean algebra B using the definitions of complement, meet,
and join introduced earlier. A truth functional θ is a function on B taking the values 0 or 1
in a way which satisfies (1), so it has the form
θk(P ) =
{
1 if PDk = Dk,
0 if PDk = 0,
(6)
where Dk is one of the elements of (3). Note that the collection D of cells constitutes a
sample space, because in any given “experiment” the phase point γ representing the system
will be in one and only one of the cells. The truth functional θk corresponds to the case in
which the phase point γ is somewhere in the cell Dk; it assigns the value 1 to all collections
of cells whose union contains the phase point, and 0 to all others. One can again interpret
θk(P ) as a conditional probability, assuming that the probability assigned to Dk is positive.
Notice that it is because we are assuming that P is of the form (5) that the product
PDk must have one of the two forms on the right side of (6): no property of the form (5)
can include part but not all of some cell Dk. Consequently, (6) defines a truth functional for
indicators belonging to this particular algebra B, but not for all possible properties; in this
sense a truth functional is relative to a particular coarse graining D, or its Boolean algebra
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B. However, in classical mechanics it is possible to construct a universal truth functional
which is not limited to a single Boolean algebra, but which will assign 0 or 1 to any indicator
on the classical phase space in a manner which satisfies (1). To do this, choose some point
γq in Γ, and let
θq(P ) = P (γq). (7)
That is, θq assigns the value 1 to any property which contains the point γq, and 0 to any
property which does not contain this point, in agreement with how one would normally
understand “true” in a case in which the state of the system is correctly described by the
phase point γq.
3 Quantum Truth Functionals and the Single Family
Rule
The quantum counterpart of a classical phase space is a Hilbert space H. For our purposes
it suffices to consider cases in which H is of finite dimension, thus avoiding the mathematical
complications of infinite-dimensional spaces. Following von Neumann [23], we associate a
quantum property, the counterpart of a set of points in the classical phase space, with a
linear subspace P of H, or the corresponding orthogonal projection operator or projector P
onto this subspace. If I is the identity operator, the negation of a property P corresponds to
the projector I−P , and the conjunction P ∧Q of two properties corresponds to the projector
PQ in the case in which P and Q commute with each other. If PQ 6= QP , then neither PQ
nor QP is a projector, so there is no obvious way to define a property corresponding to the
conjunction, an issue to which we shall return.
The quantum counterpart of a coarse graining of a classical phase space is a decomposition
D of the identity, a collection of mutually orthogonal projectors {Dj} satisfying (4) whose
sum is the identity, as in (3). This decomposition gives rise to a set of projectors of the form
(5), all of which commute with each other, and which form a Boolean algebra B analogous
to the algebra of classical indicator functions. One can define a quantum truth functional
θ on the elements of B in the manner indicated previously: it assigns to every projector P
in B a value 0 or 1 in a way which satisfies the three conditions in (1). Once again, any
truth functional of this type can be written in the form (6) for some k, and thus there is a
one-to-one correspondence between truth functionals and the elements of D, which one can
think of as the quantum version of a sample space.
The CH approach to quantum theory is “realistic” in the sense that it treats the members
of a particular decomposition of the identity, a quantum sample space, as mutually exclusive
possibilities, one and only one of which occurs, or is true, for a particular physical system at
a particular instant of time, in precisely the same sense as in classical statistical mechanics.
The difference between quantum and classical physics emerges not when one considers a
single quantum sample space, but when one asks about the relationship between two or
more different sample spaces. Here quantum theory is very different from classical physics
because the product of two quantum projectors P and Q on the same Hilbert space can
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depend upon the order, and when PQ is unequal to QP , neither of these products is a
projector. By contrast, the product of two indicators on the same classical phase space is
always an indicator, since multiplication is commutative. For example, for a spin-half particle
with components of angular momentum Sx, Sy, and Sz (in units of h¯), the projector for the
property Sx = +1/2, which is
1
2
I + Sx, does not commute with
1
2
I + Sz, the projector for
Sz = +1/2. Consequently, a key question in quantum theory, with no counterpart in classical
physics, is: How can one make sense out of the conjunction of two quantum properties, such
as Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = +1/2, when the corresponding projectors do not commute with
each other?
The answer of the consistent historian is that one cannot make sense of Sx = +1/2 AND
Sz = +1/2; it is a meaningless statement in the sense that (CH) quantum theory assigns it
no meaning. There are no hidden variables, and thus there is a one-to-one correspondence
between quantum properties and subspaces of the Hilbert space in CH quantum theory. Since
every one-dimensional subspace of the two-dimensional Hilbert spaceH of a spin-half particle
corresponds to a spin in a particular direction, there is no subspace left over which could
plausibly represent the property Sx = +1/2 AND Sz = +1/2. To be sure, one might assign
to it the zero element ofH, a zero-dimensional subspace corresponding to the property which
is always false (analogous to the classical indicator which is 0 everywhere). This, in fact, was
the proposal, for this particular situation, of Birkhoff and von Neumann in their discussion
of quantum logic [24]. It is important to notice the difference between their approach and
the one used in CH. A proposition which is meaningful but false is very different from a
meaningless proposition: the negation of a false proposition is a true proposition, whereas
the negation of a meaningless proposition is equally meaningless. The Birkhoff and von
Neumann approach requires, as they themselves pointed out, a modification of the ordinary
rules of propositional logic, whereas the CH approach does not.1 However, in CH quantum
theory it then becomes necessary to exclude meaningless talk from meaningful discussions,
a task which is not altogether trivial.
Generalizing from this example, the CH approach requires that a meaningful probabilistic
description of a single single quantum system at a particular time must employ a single
framework: a single Boolean algebra of commuting projectors generated, in the sense of (5),
from a specific decomposition of the identity or quantum sample space. To be sure, many
alternative descriptions can be constructed using different decompositions of the identity;
the single-framework rule is certainly not intended to restrain the imagination of theoretical
physicists! However, combining results from different sample spaces into a single description
is forbidden by the single-framework rule, apart from the following exception.
Two frameworks involving properties of a single system at a single time (we are ignoring
genuine histories, for which the rules are more complex) are said to be compatible provided the
two Boolean algebras are parts of a single, larger Boolean algebra of commuting projectors.
This is true if and only if every projector belonging to one of the original algebras commutes
with every projector belonging to the other algebra, which in turn is the same as requiring
that the projectors from the two decompositions of the identity, or sample spaces, commute
1For further remarks on some of these issues, see Sec. IV A of [6].
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with one another. A larger collection of frameworks is compatible if all pairs are compatible,
and frameworks are said to be mutually incompatible if they are not compatible. Descriptions
based upon two or more compatible frameworks can always be combined by using the single
Boolean algebra which contains all of the different (mutually commuting) algebras, and thus
one is still employing a single framework, corresponding to a single decomposition of the
identity, in accordance with the single-framework rule.
The single-framework rule is not at all unreasonable from the perspective of elementary
probability theory, where problems are generally set up using a single sample space. Thus
if a coin is to be tossed ten times in a row, the statistical properties are worked out not by
constructing ten sample spaces, but by using a single sample space containing 210 points.
The single-framework rule is also perfectly compatible with classical statistical mechanics,
for if one uses two or more coarse grainings of the phase space, the results can always be
combined by means of a single coarse graining which uses a collection of cells generated by
intersections of other cells in an obvious way. Thus ordinary probabilistic arguments and
classical statistical mechanics satisfy the single-framework rule, albeit in a somewhat trivial
sense.
As already noted, the single-framework rule as applied to Boolean algebras of properties
refers to a single system at a single instant of time. Given two nominally identical systems,
there is no reason why one cannot use one framework for the first and a different framework
for the second. For instance, in the case of two spin-half particles, Sx = +1/2 could be a
correct description of one of them at the same time that Sz = +1/2 is a correct description
of the other. Similarly, the same particle may have Sx = +1/2 at an earlier and Sz = +1/2
at a later time. Conversely, when incompatible frameworks turn up in some discussion of
a quantum system, it is best to think of them as referring to different systems, or to a
single system at different times, or perhaps simply as tentative or hypothetical proposals
without any suggestion that they should be taken in a realistic sense. (Ascribing properties
to a single system at more than one time requires the use of a history, and this requires
additional considerations which lie outside the scope of the present discussion.)
In any application of probability theory, precisely one of the elements of the sample
space is thought of as existing, or “true” in any realization of an ideal experiment. In this
sense the notion of “truth” in a probabilistic theory is necessarily connected with, and thus
depends upon the sample space or framework one is considering. In classical physics one can
forget about this dependence, because if more than one framework is under consideration,
in the case of a single system at a single time, they can always be combined into a single
framework. This is reflected in the fact that one can always define a universal truth functional
for a classical phase space, as noted in Sec. 2. Because of the possibility that frameworks
can be incompatible, the framework dependence of “true” is not at all trivial in quantum
physics; indeed, one might say that this is one of the main ways in which the mathematical
structure of quantum theory forces one to adopt a different kind of physical interpretation
from what one is used to in classical mechanics.
In particular, in quantum theory there is no universal truth functional θq which can be
used to assign values of 0 and 1 to all projectors in a way which agrees with the three
conditions in (1). In a certain sense this is immediately obvious for any Hilbert space of
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dimension 2 or more, since in such a space there will always be projectors P and Q which do
not commute with each other. In such a case PQ is not a projector, and the third condition
in (1) is not even defined, much less satisfied. One might hope to get around this problem
by modifying the third condition and only requiring that it hold in cases in which P and
Q commute with each other. This, however, gains very little, for the results of Bell and of
Kochen and Specker referred to earlier demonstrate that even such a “modified” universal
truth functional does not exist for a Hilbert space of dimension 3 or more. (A simple example
due to Mermin, showing the impossibility of a universal truth functional in a Hilbert space
of dimension 4, is discussed in [21].)
The absence of a universal truth functional causes no difficulties for CH quantum the-
ory because of the single-framework rule, which prevents the comparison of incompatible
frameworks. The situation is different for the alternative principle proposed by Bassi and
Ghirardi, which they have somehow managed to confuse with the single-framework rule, and
which will be taken up next.
4 The Every-Framework Principle of Bassi and Ghi-
rardi
In [17] Bassi and Ghirardi introduce, in the discussion leading up to and including their
(6.1), what I shall call the “every-framework principle”, which in the notation of the present
paper can be stated in the following way.
Consider a quantum Hilbert space, and let {Df} be the different possible decompositions
of the identity, where f is a label which takes on uncountably many values. For example,
for a spin-half particle, f will run over all directions in space w, as long as +w is identified
with −w, since each decomposition of the identity corresponds to a sample space with just
the two points Sw = ±1/2. Corresponding to Df there is a corresponding Boolean algebra
Bf of projectors of the form (5). Given a projector P , we define
F(P ) = {f : P ∈ Bf} (8)
to be the collection of labels such that P is a member of the Boolean algebra Bf .
The every-framework principle asserts that there is a collection of truth functionals {θf},
one for each decomposition of the identity, with the following property: if P is any projector
in the Hilbert space, the value of θf(P ) is the same for all f in F(P ). That is to say, P
is assigned precisely the same truth value, 0 or 1, by all members of the collection {θf} for
which θf (P ) is actually defined.
The every-framework principle has a certain intuitive appeal when one is thinking of a
single system at a single time. It is actually correct for classical statistical mechanics, where
a property P is true as long as the representative phase point γ is inside the corresponding
set P, and false otherwise. Hence to construct a collection of truth functionals, associated
with a collection of coarse grainings, satisfying the every-framework principle, one simply
chooses some representative point γq in the phase space, and for a coarse graining Df lets
the indicator for the cell which contains γq play the role of the special Dk in (6). Or, to
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put the matter in a slightly different way, one simply lets θf be the restriction to Bf of the
universal truth functional defined in (7).
Given this result, one is not surprised to learn that the quantum-mechanical version of
the every-framework principle implies the existence of a universal truth functional θu of the
modified form discussed towards the end of Sec. 3. For each P , one sets θu(P ) equal to the
common value specified by the every-framework principle, noting that every P is contained
in at least one decomposition of the identity, that consisting of P and I − P . Since when
restricted to the Boolean algebra Bf the functional θu is identical to θf , it is at once evident
that the first two requirements in (1) will always be satisfied, while the third will be satisfied
in cases in which P and Q commute, since there is then at least one Boolean algebra Bg
which contains both of them, and θu when restricted to Bg is the same as the corresponding
truth functional θg.
But, as we have already noted, the nonexistence of a universal truth functional has been
proven mathematically for any Hilbert space of dimension greater than two. Consequently,
the every-framework principle is in clear contradiction with the principles of quantum me-
chanics. The proofs of this fact given in [16, 17] are correct but superfluous; they simply
repeat what is already well known to people who work in the foundations of quantum theory.
What is the relationship of the every-framework principle and the single-framework rule?
They are mutually contradictory, for fairly obvious reasons. The every-framework princi-
ple requires us to compare the results of truth functionals, or equivalently sample spaces,
associated with different and in general incompatible frameworks, in precisely the manner
forbidden by the single-framework rule. According to the latter, such a comparison makes
no sense in the case of incompatible frameworks. (Note that it is only with the help of
incompatible frameworks that one can reach a contradiction using the Bell-Kochen-Specker
approach, so incompatible frameworks are essential to the argument in [17].) To be sure,
two different frameworks might refer to two different systems (or the same system at two
different times), but in that case there is no reason whatsoever to expect that a particular
property has the same truth value for the two systems, and thus no motivation for invoking
the every-framework principle.
One must admit that the every-framework principle has a certain intuitive appeal: how
could the truth value of some physical property possible depend upon the sample space in
which it is embedded? Surely if it is true it is really true, apart from anything one can say
about the rest of the world, and if it is false it is false! This appeal is seductive because it
focuses attention on the physical property rather than on the sample space. When, however,
one pays attention to the latter, things appear in a quite different light. Let us consider as
an example two incompatible quantum sample spaces
S1 = {A,B,C}. S2 = {A,D,E}, (9)
where A, B, and C are three projectors which add up to I, and likewise A + D + E = I.
However, neither B nor C commutes with either D or E.
Let us employ the every-framework principle, and suppose that A is false in both S1 and
S2. Because S1 is a sample space, this means that either B or C is true, and because S2 is
a sample space, either D or E must be true. Suppose for the sake of argument that it is B
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which is true in S1 and D which is true in S2. Then if we insist that S1 and S2 apply to the
same system at the same time, this means that two properties represented by non-commuting
projectors are simultaneously true. For example, they could be Sx = +1/2 and Sz = +1/2
for a spin-half particle. This is hard to reconcile with the Hilbert space structure of ordinary
quantum mechanics, as pointed out in Sec. 3, and in CH quantum theory it is forbidden by
the single-framework rule. Thus we see that when A is false, the every-framework principle
has certain implications which, when brought to light, make it much less appealing.
The case in which A is true in both S1 and S2 also leads to unsatisfactory results. Because
S1 and S2 are sample spaces, the truth of A means that all four properties B, C, D, and E
are false. One might be tempted to suppose that the falsity of two incompatible properties is
unproblematical—after all, who cares about things which do not occur? The trouble is that
when B is false, its negation B˜ = I −B is true. Furthermore, if two projectors B and E do
not commute, the same is true of their negations B˜ and E˜ = I − E. Thus using the every-
framework principle once again leads to the conclusion that two properties represented by
non-commuting operators are simultaneously true. In summary, whatever may be its initial
intuitive appeal, much of the allure of the every-framework principle vanishes when one
realizes what it really means.
Let us look at this example from a slightly different perspective, by introducing a third
sample space
S0 = {A, A˜ = I − A} (10)
containing only A and its negation. This is obviously the smallest sample space in which
“A is true” and “A is false” make sense. The sample space S0 is compatible with both S1
and with S2, each of which represents a refinement of S0. The rules of quantum reasoning
employed in [5] allow one to deduce that if A is true/false in S0, then it is also true/false in S1,
and the same deduction is possible going from S0 to S2. However, the single-framework rule
prevents combining these results in a single description: one cannot employ both S1 and S2
for the same system at the same time, for the reasons indicated previously. This means that
at least some of the intuitive appeal which seems to lie behind the every-framework principle,
the notion that the truth of some property should not depend upon what else is going on in
the world, is supported in CH quantum theory. And this can be done in a consistent way
without leading to any logical contradictions precisely because the CH approach employs
the single-framework rule rather than the every-framework principle.
The single-framework rule and the every-framework principle are, thus, completely incom-
patible with each other, whether one regards them either from a purely formal perspective—
the former forbids combinations which the latter allows—or in terms of their intuitive signif-
icance. Hence one can only regard with astonishment the claim of Bassi and Ghirardi, found
in the very next sentence after their (6.1), that the every-framework principle constitutes the
“only reasonable way” to interpret the single-framework rule! It is hard to imagine a more
serious misunderstanding of a rule that has been stated over and over again in the litera-
ture on CH quantum theory, and illustrated by means of numerous examples. Discussions
and criticisms of the single-framework rule can be a valuable component of the scientific
enterprise. But to introduce a new principle which is not only different from, but directly
contrary to the single-framework rule, and then claim that the former is the only reasonable
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way to interpret the latter does nothing but cause confusion.
5 Some Other Issues
Aside from the every-framework principle, there are some other points in [17] (and also [18])
which merit at least a brief response.
• In Secs. 4 and 9 of [17], Bassi and Ghirardi assert that what I call MQS (macroscopic
quantum superposition) states—for example, Schro¨dinger’s infamous cat—are physically un-
acceptable, and fault the CH approach for not providing some criterion for excluding them.
In response, it will help to use an analogy from classical physics, while remembering that
any classical analogy can only go part way in helping us understand quantum phenomena. A
coin spontaneously rising a centimeter above a table on which it is sitting at rest is physically
unacceptable in the sense that such a violation of the second law of thermodynamics is never
observed to occur, despite the fact that nothing in the laws of classical mechanics excludes
such a possibility. We understand why we never observe such things by using statistical
mechanics, which assigns an extremely small probability to such an event. That is, we have
a scientific understanding of why violations of the second law are not observed, despite the
fact that the laws of classical (and also quantum) mechanics permit such possibilities.
The quantum Hilbert space certainly contains MQS states, because it is, by definition,
a linear vector space which includes superpositions of any of its elements. However, MQS
states are incompatible, in the quantum sense, with the quasi-classical framework(s) [3]
needed to describe our ordinary experience with macroscopic objects. Thus the single-
framework rule tells us that it makes no sense trying to include MQS states in descriptions
of the everyday world of human experience. Conversely, if a quantum description employs
the MQS state that is (formally) a linear superposition of a live and dead cat, it makes
no sense, according to the single-framework rule, to think of the whatever-it-is as somehow
involving a cat, for the properties typically used to identify a cat will, in quantum theory, be
represented by projectors which do not commute with the MQS state, and are therefore of
no use for discussing the meaning of such a state. In this sense, at least, CH quantum theory
does provide criteria for excluding MQS states from certain types of quantum descriptions.
Quantum physicists who refuse to employ the single-framework rule must, of course, find
some other means of disposing of, or perhaps peacefully coexisting with MQS states. It is also
worth noting that the reason quantum superpositions states of this sort cannot be detected
in the laboratory, even for microscopic objects, as long as they contain a substantial number
of atoms, is by now reasonably well understood in terms of the process of decoherence, a
topic which has been treated from the CH perspective by Omne`s [7]. (Decoherence is much
like classical irreversibility, making the jumping coin an even better analogy.) To summarize
the situation, CH quantum theory certainly permits descriptions using MQS states, but at
the same time provides an explanation as to why they are neither needed nor particularly
useful for a science of the macroscopic world.
• In a not unrelated point, Bassi and Ghirardi suggest that one may be able to get
around the difficulties they have encountered by employing their every-framework rule by
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making a drastic reduction in the set of consistent families which can be considered to be
physically significant.
In response, there is nothing wrong with these authors announcing a direction for their
future research, as long as they make it plain that the motivation for it comes not from
any problem involving the CH approach, but rather from the disagreement between their
every-framework principle (itself completely contrary to the CH single-framework rule) and
standard quantum theory. No proposal for using a restricted class of families in the manner
they propose has thus far turned out to be very useful for quantum interpretation, but no
doubt those who consider this a worthwhile approach will continue the search.
• Bassi and Ghirardi take the position, both in Sec. 6 of [17] and in [18], that the only
alternative to their every-framework principle in which any property P has the precisely the
same truth value in every framework which contains it, is to suppose that in certain of frame-
works it is true and in other frameworks it is false, something they consider unacceptable.
The response to this is contained in the material in Sec. 4 above, but it may be worthwhile
making it quite explicit. From the CH perspective, using two incompatible frameworks to
describe the same system at the same time is not meaningful—this is precisely the point of
the single-family rule. Since meaningless truth values are meaningless, there is no reason
to be concerned about whether they agree or disagree. Alternatively, one can suppose that
two incompatible frameworks do not refer to the same system at the same time. In that
case, there is no a priori reason to expect the truth values for a particular property to be
the same, and so no reason to be worried if they are different.
• In [18] Bassi and Ghirardi assert that in the previous literature on consistent histories
the single-framework rule was not explained well enough or clearly enough so as to obviously
exclude their every-framework principle.
It is quite true that the language of truth functionals was not employed by consistent
historians (so far as I am aware) prior to the recent [21]. Previous work used the standard
language of elementary probability theory, with its sample spaces and event algebras, and
assumed the usual association between probability theory and reality, as pointed out, for
example, in Sec. 7.2.3 of [1]. A basic understanding of how sample spaces function in ordinary
probability theory is all that one really needs in order to understand the CH approach and
the significance of the single-framework rule, including the fact that it is quite contrary to
the every-framework principle. The use of truth functionals, while it may be advantageous
for some purposes, is not actually needed.
• At the beginning of Sec. 7.1 in [17], Bassi and Ghirardi, in a footnote, issue a challenge
to me and an anonymous referee to identify which of their four precisely formulated (in their
opinion) assumptions are inconsistent with the CH single-framework rule, and accept the
consequences of this identification.
In fact these four assumptions are not precisely formulated, as was pointed out in [21].
Writing in response to that, Bassi and Ghirardi [18] have themselves identified their assump-
tion (c) as the one which is incompatible with the single-framework rule, and I see no reason
to dispute this. That rejecting their (c)—the every-framework principle—leads to dire con-
sequences is not true, as should be clear from the discussion in Sec. 4 above. Instead, it
allows a sensible discussion of quantum properties using consistent quantum principles.
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6 Conclusion
In [17] Bassi and Ghirardi have, in essence, substituted their every-framework principle for
the single-framework rule of CH quantum theory, and then concluded, correctly, that the
every-framework principle makes no sense in the quantum world. Their only mistake is
in supposing that the every-framework principle has something to do with CH quantum
theory, whereas in fact the two are directly contrary to each other. While this error is easily
spotted by someone who is familiar with CH methods, it is nonetheless regrettable that
others less familiar with them have, once again, been given the mistaken impression that
there is something logically unsound, or at least suspicious, about CH quantum theory.
To be sure, Bassi and Ghirardi and other critics of CH perform a valuable function in
looking for flaws in this approach. Their failure (at least thus far) to find anything wrong
with CH, while at the same time demonstrating that the various alternatives that they
propose posses serious flaws, adds to one’s confidence that the CH approach does, in fact,
provide a satisfactory realistic interpretation of quantum theory.
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